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Commentary
John C. Weicher
ent programs can be understood only from a his-
torical perspective” (Weicher, 1980, p. 3). This is
even truer now than it was 25 years ago.
THE BUSINESS OF THE FHA
The FHA is a business and a government
agency. It is supposed to help people buy homes.
It is also expected to operate at a profit. It has
competitors in the private sector: the private
mortgage insurers (PMIs) on the low-risk side,
since the late 1950s; and the subprime lenders
on the high-risk side, since the early 1990s. It also
competes with the GSEs. The FHA has no protec-
tion from this competition. The FHA mortgage
ceiling keeps the FHA out of the market for high-
balance mortgages; it doesn’t keep anybody out
of the FHA market. If the subprime lenders or the
GSEs can take away the FHA’s business, it’s theirs.
The FHA has an obvious advantage over PMIs
and subprime lenders. FHA insurance carries
the full faith and credit of the government of the
United States. Conversely, it has the disadvantage
of being a government agency—being less flexible
and having to obtain congressional approval for
major changes in its activities. The net result is
that the FHA does serve a market segment that
its competitors apparently can’t, and it serves
that market without losing money.
Quigley states that the FHA’s market share
has declined systematically since the late 1950s.
It is infuriatingly difficult to construct a consistent
time series on FHA activity, or the home-mortgage
L
et me start by explaining my perspective
on federal housing credit programs.
During 2001-05, I served as Federal
Housing Administration (FHA)
Commissioner at the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) and also Assistant
Secretary for Housing. I managed the FHA pro-
grams and was, therefore, responsible for half a
trillion dollars of mortgage insurance exposure
backed by the full faith and credit of the govern-
ment of the United States. I was also the “mission
regulator” for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—
not the safety and soundness regulator (I need
to make that very clear)—responsible for the
housing goals, new program approval, and a
few other matters.  
I was also at HUD during the administration
of the first President Bush, running the Office
of Policy Development and Research. In that
capacity, I was responsible for developing an
FHA reform proposal that was enacted in 1990,
and also was the regulator for the government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs), regulating both their
safety and soundness and public purpose. Earlier,
I was chief economist at HUD in the mid-1970s.
So, I have a fairly long historical perspective.
Quigley’s (2006) paper is well worth reading as
an introduction to federal housing credit activities.
He has a good sense of what is important. I follow
his order in my comments: the FHA’s business,
the FHA’s public purposes, and then similarly
for the GSEs. I begin with a general point: Quigley
is absolutely right about the path-dependency of
housing policy. I’ve felt that way for years: “pres-
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        market for that matter, but Quigley’s strenuous
effort to overcome the limitations (his Figure 3)
misinterprets the trend. FHA’s modern period
began in the early 1970s, when the Government
National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae)
began issuing securities backed by pools of FHA-
insured mortgages; these mortgage-backed secu-
rities (MBS) increased investor demand for FHA
loans and gave the FHA a new importance in the
mortgage market. This is masked in Figure 3 by
the peak around 1970 that was caused by the
Section 235 subsidized-homeownership program,
in which about 500,000 low-income families
bought homes with interest rate subsidies on FHA-
insured mortgages between 1969 and 1974. In
addition, Figure 3 includes refinances as well as
home-purchase loans. The FHA’s overall market
share has a strong negative correlation with the
share of refinances in the mortgage market. FHA
homeowners take advantage of low rates by refi-
nancing, like other homeowners; but about half
of them refinance out of the FHA. 
The most appropriate way to measure the
FHA’s market share is to look at home-purchase
loans as a share of the home-purchase market,
excluding the Section 235 program. Consistent
data for FHA home-purchase loans are available
since 1980; consistent data on total FHA endorse-
ments are available since 1971. Figure 1 reports the
FHA’s share of the unsubsidized home-purchase
market since 1971, measured by the number of
homes rather than the dollar volume of mortgage
originations.1 For 1971-79, refinances are included
and, thus, the FHA’s market share in the early years
is overstated. Very recently, anecdotal evidence
suggests that investors have been active buyers
of homes, intending to profit by resale. The FHA
Weicher
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1 There are two HUD data sources for FHA home mortgages insured
from 1971 through 1979: the 1979 Statistical Yearbook (HUD, 1980)
and the quarterly report on U.S. Housing Market Conditions (HUD,
2001). Typically the Statistical Yearbook reports about 10,000 to
15,000 fewer homes insured. Figure 1 uses the data from U.S.
Housing Market Conditions, for consistency with later years. New-
home sales are estimated by the Census Bureau, and existing-home
sales by the National Association of Realtors; both are reported in
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Figure 1
FHA Share of the Home-Purchase Market, 1971-2005
NOTE: FHA purchases during the 1970s exclude homes for low-income families with subsidized mortgages insured under Section 235 of
the National Housing Act and include refinances as well as home purchases. Variables are constructed as described in the text.allows mortgage insurance only for owner-
occupants. Investor purchases cannot be identi-
fied in any data series to my knowledge, so it is
likely that the FHA’s share in the past two or three
years is understated. Throughout the period,
homes bought for cash are included in the home-
purchase market; such purchases seem to account
typically for about 20 percent of all homes, and
there does not appear to be a trend. 
Since 1971, the FHA’s share of the home-
purchase market has been rising, not falling—
the FHA’s share has risen by 0.11 percent of the
market annually. This trend is not statistically
significant (t-ratio of 1.5), but it exists even though
the inclusion of refinances in the numerator
during the 1970s and investor purchases in the
denominator during the 2000s both bias the trend
in a downward direction. A similar but weaker
trend exists for the period since 1980.
The FHA’s market share has dropped in the
past three years; it is premature to say whether this
is a trend or a blip or the consequence of investor
activity.2 The FHA’s demise has been predicted
at regular intervals since at least 1973. I first came
to HUD that year and was promptly told that the
FHA was on its last legs because of competition
from the private mortgage insurers. Since then,
the FHA has insured 19 million home mortgages.
Quigley briefly mentions the FHA’s multi-
family business. He is correct that the subsidized-
production programs greatly increased the FHA’s
role in this sector; even though the last of these
was terminated in 1983, subsidized projects still
account for about half of the FHA’s total current
multi-family portfolio. He is not correct, however,
in saying that the relative importance of multi-
family lending has systematically declined. The
FHA’s unsubsidized multi-family activity has been
growing since 1992. Moreover, the FHA now is
able to operate the programs without losing
money. This is primarily due to the Credit Reform
Act of 1990. Before then, the FHA lost money on
its multi-family programs and required an annual
appropriation. The Act forced the FHA to operate
on a more businesslike basis. It provided the
impetus for an effort that began in 1991 and cul-
minated in 2002, when the FHA was able first to
break even and then to lower insurance premiums
as its revenues continued to exceed losses. By
2004, the premium had been cut to 45 basis points,
the lowest in FHA history, and volume was about
four times as much as in 1991.
Nonetheless, FHA multi-family insurance is
a difficult business. It is complicated—each deal
is unique; it is staff-intensive—it constitutes 15
percent of the FHA’s portfolio but requires two-
thirds of the FHA’s staff; it is political—each proj-
ect is large, and both the project and the developer
are locally important; and it is where the HUD
scandals most often occur. Twice I’ve come to HUD
in the aftermath of multi-family scandals—the
first time knowing that’s what I was doing and
the second time finding out when I got there. 
THE FHA’S PUBLIC PURPOSES
Quigley’s main recommendation for the FHA
is that it be limited to serving the first-time home-
buyer. That’s not a new idea; the original public
purpose of the FHA was to promote homeowner-
ship, especially for young families buying their
first home. That still is the purpose and the basic
business.3 The overwhelming majority of FHA
home-purchase loans are for first-time home-
buyers—for the past seven to eight years they have
accounted for 75 to 80 percent of all FHA-insured
home-purchase loans. (For the VA, the share is
just over 70 percent.) Also, about 35 to 40 percent
of these first-time buyers are members of minority
groups. 
So, the FHA already is largely doing what
Quigley recommends. But not entirely, and I don’t
think it needs to. Quigley seems to be saying that
the FHA shouldn’t insure refinances. I think
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2 The decline in FHA’s business between 2003 and 2005 is paralleled
by similar declines for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
mortgage guarantee program and for the PMIs. The FHA’s total
endorsements, including refinances, declined by 62 percent; VA
guaranties by 69 percent; and PMI certificates by 37 percent.
(Refinances are included for the FHA because home-purchase data
are not available for the VA or PMIs.) This may suggest a general
decline in the market for mortgage insurance, but such a conclu-
sion is certainly premature; 2003 was the highest year in the past
35 for both the FHA and PMIs and the second highest for the VA.
3 The VA has gone the other way. Originally a veteran could use
his VA entitlement only once; since 1974 it has been extended to
homeowning veterans who are trading up.they should. Most FHA refinances are “stream-
line” refinances, with no cash out; the home-
owner is simply lowering the monthly mortgage
payment. That helps the owner and reduces the
FHA’s risk exposure. The FHA should be available
for those FHA borrowers who want to refinance
with the FHA. 
It is less important, but I don’t see any reason
to exclude current homeowners from “trading
up”—or down, for that matter—through the FHA.
Not many do. They generally are owners who
don’t have a lot of equity in their current home;
otherwise they would borrow through the conven-
tional market. They may have a credit problem,
which excludes them from the conventional
conforming market. But if they meet the FHA’s
more liberal underwriting standards and are will-
ing to pay for the insurance, I think they should
have the opportunity to use the FHA. It is probably
better than they can do in the subprime market.
Using the FHA makes it more likely that they will
continue to be homeowners.
Quigley concludes that the FHA doesn’t
increase homeownership very much—“by a per-
cent or so,” and more for minority groups—and
may accelerate it somewhat. I think he may be
undervaluing these achievements, particularly the
latter. Goodman and Nichols (1997) estimate that
most families that qualify only for an FHA mort-
gage in year one qualify for a conventional loan by
year six. They would not be permanently barred
from homeownership in the absence of the FHA,
they would just buy homes later. I think that accel-
erating home ownership is an important and
valuable accomplishment, for several reasons:
1. We are starting to accumulate evidence
that homeownership does have external
benefits, particularly for children. If their
parents become homeowners five years
earlier, the children have five more years
to benefit.
2. Homeownership creates wealth. The
sooner you own a home, the better off
you are likely to be, down the road. Buy-
ing a home has been as good an invest-
ment as buying stocks—not just during
the inflationary 1970s or the past few
years, but also at the beginning of the
stock market booms of the 1980s and
1990s, even though those were not boom
periods for house values. A typical FHA
first-time homebuyer probably puts about
3 percent down and pays another 3 per-
cent in closing costs. Such a typical FHA
first-time homebuyer in 1982, when the
stock market started to rise, would have
over the next five years paid off about
1.2 percent of the mortgage—not much,
but enough to have raised his or her
equity from 3 percent to 4.2 percent,
almost by half. In addition, the value of
the home would have risen by over one-
quarter. That whole increase would have
become part of the homeowner’s wealth.
All told, the equity in the home would
have risen more than fivefold. Even after
paying a 6 percent commission to sell
the house, the investment in the home
would have outperformed the Standard
and Poor’s (S&P) 500. During the 1990s
boom, starting in 1992, homes and stocks
performed about equally well over the
next five years, and from the sixth year
on, homes were a better investment.
Comparisons using other broad indices
are consistently more favorable to home-
ownership. (See Appendix A for details
of the calculations.)
3. From a national perspective, homeown-
ership is a significant factor toward a
more equal distribution of wealth. In
1992, the Gini coefficient for the distri-
bution of wealth was about 0.9 if home
equity is omitted and about 0.8 if it is
included. Similarly, the richest 1 percent
of American households owned about
43 percent of all household wealth if
home equity is omitted and about 34
percent if it is included (Weicher, 1997,
p. 10). Those are large differences. 
These seem to me to be valid reasons for a policy
and program that accelerates homeownership.
I also differ with Quigley’s judgment that most
FHA loans are inframarginal with respect to pro-
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borrowers are stretching to buy a home. They
make the minimum downpayment, and they have
few assets above the amount needed for that down-
payment and the closing costs. Further, they do
not buy very expensive homes; the typical pur-
chase price for an FHA homebuyer is still only
about $130,000. It is certainly possible that these
homebuyers might buy a slightly smaller home
for $100,000 or so, but I think the FHA’s impact
is substantially on the margin.
The FHA has also had a public purpose of
mortgage-market innovation. As Quigley men-
tions, the FHA pioneered what is now the standard
mortgage—a long-term, self-amortizing loan,
with a low down payment and level monthly
payments. It also pioneered mortgage securitiza-
tion, through Ginnie Mae, in the 1970s. These are
major changes. The FHA has been less innovative
recently. It did not pioneer the adjustable rate
mortgage (ARM) or the hybrid ARM. For the past
three years, the president’s budget has included
a proposal for a zero-down-payment mortgage
for first-time homebuyers. As FHA commissioner,
I believed that we knew how to price such an
instrument and how to underwrite it and manage
it. Congress has not approved it, at least at this
writing. That is the reason for the FHA’s less-
innovative recent history. It requires an act of
Congress to insure a new type of home mortgage.
That takes time, often years, for good reasons and
less-good reasons. The FHA has some history of
getting bitten by its innovations, although that is
mostly in its multi-family programs. With the full
faith and credit of the government at risk, it is
prudent to be cautious. People are always ready
to sell you their new perpetual-motion machine.
(On the other hand, if someone sells a new 
perpetual-motion machine to a powerful member
of Congress, the FHA could find itself in the
perpetual-motion machine business, willy-nilly.)
Also, the FHA is required by law to have a certain
net worth, as a protection against having to call
on the U.S. Treasury. One consequence of this
prudence is that the FHA’s market share may drop
when the market adopts a new instrument and
the FHA cannot insure it. Hybrid ARMs are the
most recent example. It took two acts of Congress
in the past four years for the FHA to be able to
insure the most popular type of hybrid ARM.
THE BUSINESS OF THE GSEs
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have two lines
of business: They buy conventional mortgages to
hold in their own portfolios and they securitize
mortgages, selling the securities to investors. For
both GSEs, the dollar volume of their MBS is
larger than their portfolios, but the portfolios are
growing more rapidly. Also, for both, their port-
folios account for the lion’s share of their profits
and the lion’s share of the risk to the taxpayer.
They are apparently also the source of most of
their recent financial reporting problems. 
The history of the GSEs suggests that they
have long recognized the profitability of portfolio
lending. Neither was originally expected to be in
that business. Fannie Mae was expected to buy
FHA mortgages when there was a “shortage” of
mortgage credit and sell them when there was a
“surplus.” But almost since its creation in 1938
as a government agency, it was a net investor in
mortgages, except when politically forced to sell,
as in 1954. It did not become a securities issuer
until 1981, more than a decade after Ginnie Mae
and Freddie Mac (U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development, 1987, Chap. 2). By the early
1990s, Fannie Mae’s income from its portfolio
accounted for almost three-quarters of its net
income (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 1992, p. 22). That has continued;
in 2003, its portfolio accounted for 85 percent of
its net income (U.S. Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight, 2005, Table 3).
Similarly, Freddie Mac was expected to help
the savings and loan industry (its owners) in the
same way, and it did so by issuing MBS. Freddie
Mac was created in 1970 and issued its first MBS
a year later. It held only a small portfolio; in 1990,
the volume of its MBS was about 10 times the size
of its portfolio and income from MBS guarantee
fees was about three times the income from its
portfolio (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 1991, p. 17). But once it became a
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Federal Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989, it went whole-heartedly
into portfolio lending; at present its portfolio
and MBS are almost equal. As with Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac’s portfolio accounted for 85 percent
of its net income in 2003 (U.S. Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight, 2005, Table 13).
Thus, there is good reason why the current policy
discussion about GSE regulation is substantially
focused on their portfolios. 
In discussing the subsidy to the GSEs, Quigley
suggests that this benefit might go in part to mort-
gage originators, because they can decide which
mortgages to sell to the GSEs and perhaps force the
GSEs to pay a premium for the better mortgages.
I think any originator that followed such a strategy
would face retribution from the GSEs. Differences
in loan performance would be observable. The
GSEs could charge higher guarantee fees, reduce
the price for portfolio mortgages, or refuse to do
business with any such originator. Thus, I believe
the subsidy goes either to the borrower or to the
GSE, mostly the latter. 
One of the biggest issues in the current legis-
lation is the House bill provision setting aside 5
percent of GSE profits in an affordable-housing
fund. I do not favor this provision, but it is inter-
esting to put it in the context of the subsidy. The
Congressional Budget Office calculates that the
retained subsidy over the five years from 1996 to
2000 totals about $16.7 billion. The GSEs’ profits
over those five years total $25.7 billion. The sub-
sidy accounts for 65 percent of the GSEs’ profits;
the affordable-housing fund would require them
to give 5 percent back. That does not seem like
an efficient affordable-housing program.
One further point about the advantages of
agency status, which Quigley briefly touches on:
As a longtime resident of Washington, D.C., I
cannot help noting that the local income tax that
Fannie Mae has not had to pay would have been
enough to balance the D.C. budget, year by year,
in the early 1990s, and perhaps the city could
have avoided the ignominy of a control board
and the loss of some home-rule privileges. 
THE GSEs’ PUBLIC-POLICY 
PURPOSES
The congressional acts that chartered the
GSEs require the GSEs to “provide ongoing assis-
tance to the secondary market for residential
mortgages (including activities relating to mort-
gages on housing for low- and moderate-income
families involving a reasonable economic return
that may be less than the return earned on other
activities)” and to “promote access to mortgage
credit throughout the Nation (including central
cities, rural areas, and underserved areas)”
(Federal National Mortgage Association Charter
Act, Sections 301 (3) and (4); Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation Act, Sections 301 (b) (3)
and (4)).
In 1992, the Federal Housing Enterprises
Financial Safety and Soundness Act (FHEFSSA)
quantified these purposes by establishing three
affordable-housing goals. For two of these goals
(low- and moderate-income housing and special
affordable housing), the statute defined the goals
and empowered HUD to determine the share of
GSE mortgage purchases to be devoted to those
goals; for the third (underserved areas), HUD was
required to both define the goal and establish the
numerical target. FHEFSSA also required HUD
to consider “the ability of the enterprises to lead
the industry in making mortgage credit available
for low- and moderate-income families” in estab-
lishing the targets (FHEFSSA, Sections 1332 (b) (5),
1333 (a) (2) (D), and 1334 (b) (5)).
After a dozen years of experience, it is clear
that the GSEs do not provide market leadership
in the goal categories. Instead, the GSEs have
generally underperformed the market. (See, for
example, Bunce, 2002, and U.S. National Archives
and Records Administration, 2004.) That is, the
share of GSE purchases that falls into each of the
goal categories is typically less than the share of
the overall market that falls into those categories.
This comparison is limited to mortgages to first-
time homebuyers. It excludes refinances because
the GSEs’ public purpose is to promote home-
ownership and excludes rental housing because
the market calculations are based on Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data. Less-
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mates of the multi-family housing market show
the same pattern. 
Table 1 compares GSE purchases in each goal
category to the conventional conforming market
through 2003, the latest available comparision.
The market is defined to include manufactured
home loans and the top half of the subprime
market (“alt-A” and “A-minus” loans), both of
which are purchased by the GSEs; it excludes FHA
and VA loans and refinances. Data for the market
come from HMDA data compiled by the Federal
Reserve Board and are limited to metropolitan
areas. The table shows that until very recently the
GSEs have regularly lagged the market; loans in
each goal category constitute a smaller share of
each GSE’s purchases than they do of the overall
conventional conforming market. In 1992, for
example, loans to low- and moderate-income
borrowers constituted 29.2 percent of Fannie
Mae’s purchases and 28.7 percent of Freddie
Mac’s, while they constituted 34.4 percent of the
overall conventional conforming market. Other
lenders, without the GSEs’ agency status, devoted
more of their purchases to mortgages for low- and
moderate-income borrowers. The same is true for
the other categories. 
The table also shows that the GSEs have
improved their performance over time. Indeed,
Fannie Mae led or matched the market in two of
the three goal categories in both 2002 and 2003 and
Freddie Mac led the market once in 2002. (These
are shown in boldface in the table.) Fannie Mae
has typically performed somewhat better than
Freddie Mac, except during 1999-2000. The GSE
data are calculated on the basis of the year the
mortgage was originated since 1996 because that
is the basis on which HMDA data are reported.
Unlike HMDA data, however, the GSE data include
mortgages that are purchased after the origination
year; thus they may overstate GSE performance
relative to the market. (GSE data for 1992-95 are
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Table 1
GSE Housing Goal Performance Relative to the Conventional Conforming Market: Share of
Single-Family Mortgages within Goal Categories (percent)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Low- and moderate-income housing
Fannie Mae 29.2 35.0 40.1 37.1 38.5 37.9 39.7 41.0 41.4 42.5 45.5 47.0
Freddie Mac 28.7 32.3 35.6 33.9 34.5 35.7 38.8 42.3 41.3 40.7 44.7 43.5
Conventional 34.4 38.9 41.8 41.4 42.2 42.1 42.8 44.8 43.9 42.9 44.6 44.6
conforming market
Underserved areas
Fannie Mae 18.3 18.2 22.5 22.8 23.3 21.8 21.3 21.3 23.4 24.0 26.0 26.3
Freddie Mac 18.6 17.6 19.2 19.1 19.6 19.7 20.0 21.5 22.2 22.4 25.3 23.4
Conventional  22.2 21.9 24.3 25.4 24.9 24.8 24.2 25.2 26.2 25.2 26.3 27.6
conforming market
Special affordable housing 
Fannie Mae 6.3 8.8 11.4 10.5 11.6 11.3 12.4 13.2 13.7 14.6 16.1 16.8
Freddie Mac 6.5 7.8 9.2 8.9 9.4 10.0 12.2 14.0 14.0 13.5 16.0 15.3
Conventional  10.4 12.6  14.1 14.4 15.0 15.1 15.4 17.0 16.6 15.6 16.1 15.9
conforming market
NOTE: Boldface numbers indicate that the GSE matched or led the conventional conforming market in that category for that year.
GSE data for 1992-95 are calculated by the purchase year of the mortgage; GSE data for 1996-2003 and market data for all years are
calculated by the origination year of the mortgage.
SOURCE: 1992-1995: Bunce (2002, Table A.1); 1996-2003: U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (2004, Table A.16).reported on the basis of the year the GSE pur-
chased the loan, regardless of origination year.
This difference does not affect the trends or
conclusions.)  
It is important to distinguish “meeting the
goals” from “leading the market.” With very few
exceptions, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have met
each goal in each year. But they have equally
rarely led the market. The explanation is that the
goals have always been set “below the market.”
This dates back to 1992, when FHEFSSA estab-
lished specific numerical targets for each goal,
pending HUD rulemaking. The initial statutory
targets turned out to be below the market. The
goals have been raised every few years, by regula-
tion; but, at the same time, the market has moved
toward more extensively serving borrowers in
the goal categories. The latest HUD regulation,
promulgated in 2004 for the years 2005-08, does
set the goals at the projected market levels, or
more precisely within the projected market ranges,
rising to the upper end of the projected range by
2008.
That housing goals have been set below the
market is the simplest explanation for research
findings that the GSEs have minimal impact on
mortgage credit or housing outcomes. Quigley
offers a different explanation. He cites a very
recent unpublished paper by An and Bostic
(2006), which argues that the housing goals are
ineffective because they merely push the GSEs
into competing with the FHA and taking part of
the FHA’s market. I disagree with this interpreta-
tion. An and Bostic look at only one of the three
goals (underserved areas) and, in fact, find no
impact from the increase in this goal between
1996 and 2000 in the census tracts that are tar-
geted by the goal. Also, An and Bostic argue on
theoretical grounds that the FHA would tighten
its underwriting standards in response to greater
GSE activity in the FHA’s market. In fact, the FHA
relaxed its standards in 1995, as shown by higher
default rates in the early policy years for post-1995
cohorts.4 More generally, the goals are set on the
basis of a definition of “market” that excludes
FHA and VA loans, and they include both multi-
family and single-family housing. A far larger
share of the multi-family market falls within each
of the goal categories. The GSEs and conventional
lenders have both argued that the impact of
increasing the goals for 2005 would be largely felt
in the multi-family market.5
The GSEs have done a poor job of serving first-
time homebuyers, particularly minority first-time
homebuyers. Table 2 compares GSE purchases of
loans to first-time homebuyers with the share of
first-time homebuyers in the conventional con-
forming markets. The comparison is not limited
to metropolitan areas but covers the entire country;
the data are derived from both the HMDA and
the American Housing Survey. The comparison
period ends in 2003 because the American
Housing Survey is a biennial survey and the data
4 Specifics of the relaxation are stated in FHA Mortgagee Letter 95-7,
issued January 27, 1995. Year-by-year claim and prepayment data
for each cohort are reported in the annual actuarial studies of the
Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund; for example, Deloitte & Touche
(2003, Appendix H).
5 Quigley (2006) actually cites a slightly later version of the paper
than I have referenced, but Raphael Bostic informs me that the
findings are not substantively different.
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Table 2
GSE Loans to First-Time Homebuyers: 1999-2003 Average (percent)
Conventional 
Fannie Mae Freddie Mac conforming market
All races/ethnic groups 26.0 26.2 38.5
All minority households 7.0 5.8 11.8
African-American and Hispanic households 4.3 3.4 8.2
SOURCE: Bunce and Gardner (2004).at present are available only through that year.
While first-time homebuyers constituted just
under 40 percent of all conventional conforming
home-purchase loans during 1999-2003, they
constituted just over 25 percent of each GSE’s
purchases. In the conventional conforming market,
8 percent of all loans went to African-American
and Hispanic households, but less than 5 percent
of each GSE’s loans went to these households.
These comparisons are somewhat biased in favor
of the GSEs because their definition of “first-time
homebuyer” is more liberal: The GSE definition is
that a family did not own a home in the previous
three years, whereas the market definition is that
a family has never owned a home. 
The GSE performance can also be measured
through the Residential Finance Survey (RFS),
conducted by the Census Bureau in conjunction
with each decennial census. This survey includes
interviews with both the borrower and the lender
about each mortgage in the sample. Data for 2001
are very similar to those reported in Table 2 (Bunce
and Gardner, 2004).
The GSEs also generally lag the market in
home-purchase mortgages to all minority house-
holds, though to a much lesser extent. This means
that they do a much better job of serving minority
homeowners who are trading up. Fannie Mae at
least may lead the market in this category. Once
you own a home, the GSEs are more likely to buy
the mortgage on your next house than they were
to buy the mortgage on your first house. This
perhaps gives point to Quigley’s recommenda-
tion that the GSEs be limited to buying first-time
homebuyer mortgages. 
The weak performance of the GSEs in serving
first-time homebuyers caused HUD to establish
home-purchase subgoals in each category for
2005-08. For example, in 2005, the home-purchase
subgoal for low- and moderate-income housing
is set at 45 percent. This means that, whatever
number of home-purchase loans the GSEs buy,
45 percent needs to be for low- and moderate-
income families. There is no requirement for the
GSEs to buy any particular number of home-
purchase loans. If a GSE buys one million home-
purchase loans in 2005, then 450,000 would need
to be for low- and moderate-income families; if it
buys 100,000 home-purchase loans, then 45,000
would need to be for low- and moderate-income
families. This subgoal is intended to ensure that
the GSEs do focus on financing home purchases
for families in the goal categories. It is as close as
HUD could come, under FHEFSSA, to establishing
a home-purchase goal. More systematic home-
purchase or first-time homebuyer goals have been
discussed as part of regulatory reform legislation.
The value of these home-purchase subgoals is
perhaps indicated by a statement from Fannie Mae
that it did not quite meet the subgoals for low- and
moderate-income homebuyers and underserved
areas in 2005 (Greener, 2006).  (This is not neces-
sarily definitive; official goal performance is meas-
ured by HUD, using the data provided by the
GSEs.  HUD invariably calculates slightly different
numbers than the GSEs.) 
I want to conclude with an often-ignored issue.
Through their agency status, the GSEs have an
advantage not only over private mortgage lenders
but also over private firms in other industries.
They have used this advantage to move into
markets for ancillary services, such as mortgage
origination software and automated underwriting
systems, and they have tried to move into mort-
gage insurance, title insurance, and creditor life
and disability insurance (U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, 1987, pp. 46-50;
and Weicher, 2001). Some of these new activities
are a far cry from the secondary mortgage market.
Most persistently, the GSEs have tried to move
closer to originating mortgages, taking advantage of
technological change. HUD’s current authority to
deny approval for new activities is sharply limited
by FHEFSSA. This issue is fundamental and needs
to be addressed in any regulatory reform legisla-
tion, but it is in danger of being overlooked.
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Comparative Rates of Return on Homeownership and the Stock Market
Starting date July 1982 October 1992
Mortgage rate 15.25% 8.50%
Mortgage principal $48,500 $48,500
Monthly payment $623 $373
Outstanding principal balance after 5 years $47,911 $46,313
Addition to home equity $589 $2,187
House-price appreciation over 5 years $14,045 $7,042
Home equity after 5 years $16,134 $10,729
Equity/initial cost 5.378 3.576
Annual rate of return 40.0% 29.0%
Annual return net of 6 percent sales commission 32.6% 19.5%
S&P 500 at starting date 185.834 1,067.052
S&P 500 after 5 years 680.134 2,640.585
Ratio 3.660 2.475
Annual return on S&P 500 29.6% 19.9%
NOTE: The comparison is based on a $50,000 home-purchase price, with a 3 percent down payment and 3 percent closing costs.
SOURCES: Housing data: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (2005, Historical Data tables); S&P 500 Index Total
Returns monthly data: www.neatideas.com/data/index.htm.
Weicher
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JULY/AUGUST 2006 321322 JULY/AUGUST 2006 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW